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Abstract
This paper uses a unique representative firm level data set to analyse the effect of domestic and
international competitive pressure and ownership changes in three emerging economies, Bulgaria
Poland and Romania.  Our main findings can be summarized as follows: Domestic competitive
pressure, measured by market structure, and increased import penetration are associated with higher
firm performance in Poland irrespective of the ownership structure of firms. Furthermore the positive
effects of increased import competition are reinforced for foreign owned firms. In contrast, in Bulgaria
and Romania, increased import penetration is associated with lower firm performance, while there is
some evidence that more competitive market structures is associated with higher total factor
productivity. However, these effects depend on the ownership structure of firms, which suggests the
existence of complementarities between competitive pressure and ownership changes.
The results also indicate that privatisation has positive effects on firm performance. In
particular, domestic private firms and foreign owned firms outperform state owned firms.
Furthermore, there is evidence that foreign owned firms do better than domestically owned private
firms especially in Bulgaria and Poland. The results on ownership are somewhat weaker for Romania.
Key words:  competitive pressure, privatisation, firm performance
JEL classification: D24, D40, D42, J42, L10, L33, P23, P314
I. Introduction
Two key features characterize the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe. First,
transition implied the creation of a large private sector, achieved by implementing mass privatisation
programmes. Second, price and trade liberalisation implied an increase in competitive pressure faced
by most incumbent firms. In this paper we use a representative firm level data set to analyse how these
increased competition and ownership changes have had an impact on firm performance in Bulgaria,
Romania and Poland.
We make at least four main contributions. First, previous studies mostly had to rely on small
samples of firms - usually of a few hundreds - collected through surveys. In contrast, this paper uses a
large representative panel of firms in manufacturing with detailed information on output and input
factors covering the years 1997-98 for Bulgaria and Romania, the years 1994 and 1998 for Poland.
We have data on more than 1500 firms in Bulgaria, 2047 firms in Romania and 17570 in Poland. The
sample contains virtually the entire population of medium and large firms in manufacturing in the
above countries
1.
Second, the data contains detailed information on ownership structure for two consecutive
years, 1997 and 1998 in Bulgaria and Romania, 1994 and 1998 in Poland. We are able to measure the
fraction of shares in firms held by the state and by private investors, observe its evolution over time
and are able to distinguish explicitly between private domestic investors and foreign investors. This is
important because it allows us to test the hypothesis that foreign firms perform better than domestic
private firms, due to their potentially higher technological expertise and/or their corporate governance
structure
2 . This distinction has not been made so far in the literature that deals with privatisation.
Furthermore, because we have data for two years we are able to control for firm specific
                                                     
1 For Poland the sample also includes small firms.
2 It is well documented that due to the mass privatisation programmes in transition economies, many of the firms were
privatised to insiders, which made restructuring of these firms more difficult. Outside ownership, such as foreign
ownership, would make restructuring easier (for an overview Estrin, 2001)5
heterogeneity, which may capture various unobservables, such as the quality of capital and labour.
Since such unobserved fixed effects are likely to be positively correlated with private ownership, we
are implicitly controlling for one of the potential sources of endogeneity of ownership.  Frydman et al
(1999) control for unobserved fixed effects in a similar way, though, they had to rely on survey data
and they only included fixed effects corresponding to various groups of firms. We control for firm
heterogeneity for each individual firm, even within the separate ownership groups. By analysing also
the effects of corporate governance on firm performance, in combination with competitive pressure,
we aim to make a contribution to the debate about the effects of privatisation on firm performance in
transition countries. As surveyed by Nellis (1999) or Estrin (2001) in a number of institutionally weak
transition countries, such as Russia, ownership change has so far not delivered on its promise.  In this
paper we analyse the effects of ownership changes on firm performance in Bulgaria and Romania, two
countries that are lagging behind in the transition process and where institutions are weaker than in
other countries.  We then compare them to Poland, which is a step ahead in the transition process.
Real GDP in Poland has been growing at an annual average rate of more than 4% since 1992, in
contrast in Bulgaria and Romania, GDP growth was still negative in 1997 and 98 and they are still far
below the pre-transition level of GDP (EBRD, 2000).
 Third, we analyse the impact of competitive pressure on firm performance. Competitive
pressure is measured at the three-digit level of sectoral disaggregation. Earlier studies had to rely on
more aggregate measures of competition (e.g. Earle and Estrin, 1996) or on qualitative measures of
competitive pressure (e.g. Konings, 1997).  Moreover, we are able to test whether competitive
pressure has different effects according to ownership type of the firm. Thus our results can be relevant
for the theoretical models that deal with the complementarity of reforms in transition countries (e.g.
Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; Roland, 2000).
A fourth contribution of this paper lies in its the comparative strength. Bulgaria and Romania
are lagging behind in the transition process, as mass privatisation only started a few years ago. Poland,
instead, is more advanced in terms of privatisation, governance and restructuring and development of
institutions, scoring the second highest marks in the EBRD assessment of the state of the transition6
(EBRD, 1998 and 2000).  The trade share in GDP of Bulgaria is 71.5%, 46.3% for Romania and
47.0% for Poland (EBRD, 1998). Recently, the flows of foreign direct investment have started to
increase rapidly. Since the mid 90s foreign direct investment inflows (FDI) have increased rapidly in
the entire region. By 1998 there was almost 10 fold increase in FDI in Bulgaria compared to 1991, for
Romania and Poland there was even a 50 and 60 fold increase in FDI by 1998  (EBRD, 2000). This
increase in FDI is a first indication that competitive pressure for domestic firms has likely gone up. It
is often argued that foreign firms possess more technological know-how and expertise which makes
them more efficient compared to domestic firms (e.g. Djankov and Hoekman, 1999). This may be of
particular relevance for firms in transition countries, given their obsolete capital structure endemic to
the communist legacy (Lizal and Svejnar, 2001).
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the herfindahl index of concentration index and import
penetration in these countries since 1993. It is clear that product market concentration is declining
relatively fast and import penetration is going up in both countries, which confirms that increased
competition is taking place
3. While many factors point towards increased product market competition
in most of the transition economies, there exists little evidence about its effects on firm performance
and the existing evidence is not conclusive. Hersch, Kemme and Bhandari (1993) estimate a standard
model of the determinants of price-cost margins on firm level survey data for Hungary, Poland and the
former Czech and Slovak Republic. When country data are pooled they find evidence that the number
of rival firms faced has some restraining effect on the price-cost margins of private firms. However,
when countries are considered individually, there seems to exist a strong effect of rivals on price-cost
margins only for Poland. Earle and Estrin (1996) investigate whether competitive forces and
privatisation had an efficiency enhancing role in Russia and found that privatisation is having an
impact on enterprise efficiency, but domestic market structure and hardening of the budget constraints
mostly had little effect. Brown and Earle (2000a) use Russian firm level panel data and find positive
effects from domestic competition on total factor productivity, although this effect appears only
                                                     
3 Fingleton et al (1996) documents and discusses the evolution of product market concentration in transition economies
and the emergence of competition policy in CEE.7
gradually 
4.  They also find that imports and better transportation infrastructures generate positive
effects. Carlin et al. (2001) use survey data of 3,300 firms in 25 transition countries to examine the
effects of competitive pressure on restructuring and firm growth and find an important and non-
monotonic effect on firm performance. They point out that the effects may vary depending on the
ownership type of the firm and the presence of soft budget constraints. The mere presence of
increased competitive pressure is indeed not sufficient to guarantee improved firm performance as
suggested by the theoretical literature which stresses the sequencing and complementarity of reforms
in transition countries (e.g. Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; Roland, 2000). For instance, if firms
remain state owned the incentive inducing effects of increased competition may be weaker. Brown
and Earle (2000b) develop a simple oligopoly model to show that privatising a firm is a substitute for
exposing it to competitive markets, while privatising its competitors is complementary. They use
Russian firm level data to report evidence, which is consistent with their model. Also Grosfeld and
Tressel (2001) use data of Polish quoted firms to investigate the issue of complementarity. They find
that competitive pressure and governance are complements, rather than substitutes. Warzynski (2001)
uses survey data of Ukrainian firms and also finds complementarity between competitive pressure and
privatisation.
In the following section we describe the data and the econometric approach for estimating firm
performance in terms of total factor productivity. Section III discusses the results and section IV is a
concluding one. Our results can be summarized as follows: Competitive pressure, measured by market
structure and increased import penetration, is associated with higher firm performance in Poland. In
contrast, in Bulgaria and Romania, increased import penetration is associated with lower firm
performance, while there is some evidence that more competitive market structures are associated
with higher total factor productivity. However, these effects depend on the ownership structure of
firms, which suggests the existence of complementarities between competitive pressure and ownership
changes. The results also indicate that privatisation has positive effects on firm performance,
especially in Bulgaria and Poland.
                                                     
4 The evidence of the effect competition has on productivity performance in capitalist societies is also mixed. Nickell
(1996) finds positive effects for UK firms, while Blanchflower and Machin (1996) find no or very weak effects.8
II.  Data and Econometric Approach
The data that we use are based on the reported company accounts of all incorporated firms in the
manufacturing sector. The data for Bulgaria and Romania cover the years 1997-98, while for Poland
we have information of the same set of firms for the years 1994 and 1998. For Bulgaria and Romania
the data are constrained to the larger firms. In particular, the data that we obtained satisfied at least
two of the following criteria: number of employees greater than 100, total assets and sales exceed 8
and 16 million USD, respectively.  All the variables are taken from published annual company
accounts, which were made consistent across countries by “Bureau Van Dyck”. The data set is called
the Amadeus data set. The data appendix describes the various sources and definitions of the data set
and the way in which we retrieved ownership information from this commercial database. We can use
information on 1500 firms in Bulgaria and 2047 firms in Romania. For Poland we do not face this
restriction on the data, so we have also access to the small firms, which resulted in a much larger
number of firms, 17570, that we could use in the analysis. The data also refer to the annual accounts
and are obtained from the Polish  Statistical Office. In constrast to the Ammadeus data set, this data
set is not a commercially exploited one and confidentiality had to be preserved.
 Table 1 and 2 show a comparison of some of the key variables with the entire population. From
table 1 it can be noted that the data in all three countries cover more than 60% of total sales in
manufacturing. Also employment coverage is quite good, especially for Bulgaria and Romania. In
table 2 a comparison between the sample and population is given for all two-digit sectors. It can be
noted that sales coverage in the various sectors included in this sample is mostly quite high for the
three countries. Thus, our data can be considered as fairly representative of the population of firms in
manufacturing in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland.
We follow a standard approach and estimate an augmented production function as in Nickell,
Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997). We use two indicators of competitive pressure: the herfindahl9
concentration ratio and import penetration (see data appendix for details on measurement). We
measure them at the three-digit NACE revision 1 industrial classification. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the
evolution of the concentration index and import penetration in the three countries. We can note how
the values of such ratios are very similar for Bulgaria and Romania and that concentration has a
downward trend, while import penetration is growing, suggesting that increased competition is taking
place. In Poland, import penetration is on average also increasing, while on average it seems that the
level of concentration is not changing much (although it actually decreases of an average level of 5%
in 1994 to an average level of 4% in 1998). The level of concentration is Poland is much lower than
that in Bulgaria and Romania. This suggests that product markets in Polish manufacturing are far
more competitive than in the two other countries, presumably because in Poland market reforms have
been implemented earlier.
Table 3 shows some summary statistics of the various firm specific variables used in the
analysis. We can note that the average firm in Romania employs over 600 people in 1998, while in
Bulgaria this is only 384. In Poland the average firm has 149 workers in 1998. This reflects the fact
that for the Polish sample we also have the smaller firms in the analysis and that restructuring in
Polish firms started earlier on.
The ownership information that we have for Bulgaria and Romania is slightly different than
that for Poland. For the former two countries we have information on the fraction of shares that is held
by each ownership type in each year. In contrast, for Poland we only know whether a firm is a
majority owned private, foreign or state firm in both years. Note from table 3 that the average fraction
of shares in 1998 held by private domestic owners is 68% in Bulgaria and 50% in Romania . If we
look at shareholding  in private firms only we observe that private investors retain on average 81% of
the total shares in private firms in Bulgaria and almost 60% in Romania. The fraction of shares held
by foreign owners is only 4% on average in Bulgaria, 11% in Romania. This reflects the relative small
fraction of firms that do have some foreign participation. However, if we look at the average fraction
of shares held by foreign owners in firms with some foreign participation only, then the average10
foreign quota  is larger than 60%. We can also note that in all countries the fraction of private and
foreign firms in total goes up over time.
In the analysis we deflated the nominal values of the relevant variables by a three-digit
producer price index, which was obtained from the central statistical offices.
III. Results
We estimate a standard log-linearised Cobb-Douglas production function augmented with
indicators of competitive pressure and ownership variables or
it jt jt it it it it i it IMP HERF FOREIGN PRIVD k n y e a a a a a a a + + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2 1 (1)
where y stands for log real value added, n stands for log employment, k stands for log of real capital
(proxied by the book value of fixed assets), PRIVD stands for the fraction of shares held by private
domestic owners, FOREIGN is the fraction of shares held by foreign owners in the firm at time t,
HERF is the herfindahl index of concentration, IMP is import penetration and e is a white noise error
term. The ownership category that is left out is the state, which refers to the fraction of shares in the
firm held by the government (treasury), including also the municipalities. Finally, we control for
unobserved heterogeneity by including a firm level fixed effect. Subscripts i refer to firm i, j refers to
sector j and  t refers to year.
We report three estimation techniques, results based on simple OLS estimates, then the fixed
effects and random effects estimator. However, the Hausman test always rejected the random effects
model. Tables 4, 5 and 6 reports the basic equations for the three countries respectively. The first
specification only considers the effects of ownership, while in the second specification we also
include competitive pressure. All specifications include a year dummy to control for common
aggregate shocks.
 From the first column in table 4 we can note that private ownership is associated with higher
total factor productivity in Bulgaria, but only in the OLS and random effects model. Once we control11
for unobserved fixed effects, we find no longer a statistically significant effect of domestic private
ownership on firm performance in Bulgaria. However,  we do find evidence that foreign firms
perform better than private domestic firms, irrespective of the estimation technique that is used. This
suggests that foreign firms might have some superior knowledge, which leads them to be more
efficient. We can note, however, that the magnitude of the coefficient drops substantially if we move
from the OLS and random effects model to the fixed effects model. The Hausman test rejects that
random effects model in favour of the fixed effects one, so we should base our interpretation on the
fixed effects model. Since the ownership variable refers to the fraction of shares held by foreign
investors we could interpret the magnitude of the coefficient as follows. If a fully state owned
enterprise became 100% owned by foreign investors then total factor productivity would increase on
average by 29%.
The first column of table 5 shows the same specification for Romania. We find strong positive
effects of private domestic ownership, but not of foreign ownership, whose coefficient is still positive,
although not statistically different from zero. Finally, the first column of table 6 shows that also in
Poland private ownership is associated with higher total factor productivity compared to non-private
firms. Note that for the Polish specification the ownership variables refer to dummies reflecting
majority ownership stakes. We can also note that foreign firms in Polish manufacturing not only
perform better than state firms, but also better than private domestic ones. As in Bulgaria this suggests
that foreign firms have some superior knowledge or expertise, which allows them to perform better
than private domestic firms.
Nickell (1996) suggested that the effect of corporate governance might be reduced once the
effects of competitive pressure are taken into account. The intuition is that competitive pressure leads
to a higher risk of bankruptcy, which should discipline managers, irrespective of corporate
governance. In the context of theoretical models that emphasize the complementarity of reforms we
would expect that the direct effects of corporate governance and competitive pressure may not be so
high, but rather the interaction between ownership changes and competitive pressure should lead to
have an impact on firm performance. In other words, increased competitive pressure may have very12
little effects when firms are state owned  as bankruptcy is less of an option. We develop this idea by
looking not only at the direct effects of competitive pressure, but also at the interactions with
ownership changes.
 In column (2) of tables 4-6 we start by including our measures of competitive pressure,
without any interaction terms with ownership structure. Again, focusing on the results of the fixed
effects estimation, we find that the same effects of ownership structure in the three countries are
robust to the inclusion of concentration and import penetration in the specification. However, we find
no effects of concentration on total factor productivity in Bulgaria. For Romania and Poland we do
find strong negative effects of concentration on total factor productivity. Thus, it seems that
competitive pressure as measured by product market concentration does not lead to higher
performance in Bulgaria, but it does so in Romania and Poland. A rather puzzling result emerges
when we look at the effects of import penetration. The effect of import penetration is negative and
statistically significant in Bulgaria and Romania, while in Poland it has the expected sign. We will
offer an explanation for this finding later on.
In tables 7 and 8 we experimented with interactions between ownership and competitive
pressure. By doing this we test whether competitive pressure has different effects in privatised firms
than in state firms. Or to put it differently, we test whether privatisation has different effects in highly
competitive sectors compared to sectors where competition is low. In table 7 we report results for
Bulgaria and Romania, while in table 8 we report results for Poland.
 We focus on the results of the fixed effects model because the Hausman test always rejects the
random effects model. In the third column of table 7 we can note that for Bulgaria the direct effects of
private domestic ownership and foreign ownership are large, positive and statistically significant. The
interaction between ownership and the herfindhal index is negative and significant, but only for
private domestic firms, while the direct effect of concentration is positive. We can also note that
domestic privately owned firms now becomes statistically significant. These results can be interpreted
in two ways. First, private ownership is associated with higher firm performance, however, this
positive effect diminishes in sectors that are less competitive. In fact, for sectors with a herfindhal13
index larger than 36% the effect of privatisation is a negative one. This confirms the existence of
complementarities between ownership and competition. Privatisation only works if there exists
enough competitive pressure or in other words if markets work. The interaction effect for foreign
firms is not statistically significant. So for foreign firms competitive pressure is not relevant. This may
be the case if foreign firms operate mostly in international, competitive markets and enter into
competitive markets. Alternatively, we could say that competitive pressure is more likely to work in
privatised firms. Based on the estimates, firms with at least 86% of the shares in private hands will
experience positive effects of increased competitive pressure. The average shareholding in private
firms that are private is 80% in Bulgaria, so most private firms are associated with positive effects of
increased competitive pressure. This result makes sense since state firms are firms that are mostly
owned by the state and these firms can typically be bailed out by the government if they make losses.
In other words, the threat of bankruptcy for such firms is of lesser importance. Note also that import
penetration is no longer statistically significant once we include the interaction effects with ownership.
We also experimented, but not reported here, with including industry sales as one of the regressors to
control for market size.  Results on ownership and competitive pressure are robust to the inclusion of
industry sales.
The results for Romania are slightly different. From column (3) in table 7 we note that the
direct ownership effects are no longer statistically significant. Concentration has a strong negative
effect, which suggests that increased competitive pressure is associated with higher total factor
productivity. However, import penetration has a negative effect. Furthermore, the interaction terms are
not statistically significant.
The analysis so far only took into account the ownership structure of firms, without making a
distinction between majority owned private and foreign firms. The fact that we find no evidence in
Romania that ownership matters, nor complemtarities between ownership changes and competitive
pressure, may be due to a large proportion of firms where the state has still a large stake in the firm
and that therefore restructuring may be postponed. In tables 8 we therefore report the same set of14
regressions but then for ownership categories defined according to a majority stake in the firm
5.
Furthermore, this specification permits to compare directly the results for Bulgaria and Romania with
the Polish ones, as only ownership dummies are available for this last country. We only report fixed
effects estimates. The Hausman test always rejected the random effects model, although the estimated
coefficients are quite similar in sign and significance.
Our main results remain robust to restraining the analysis to majority private or foreign owned
firms only. In Bulgaria we can note that majority foreign owned firms always outperform majority
owned private domestic firms and they both outperform majority owned state firms. Again, we find
evidence for positive effects of competitive pressure as measured by product market concentration,
but only in privatised firms. Competitive pressure has no effects in foreign owned firms in Bulgaria,
which suggests that foreign firms mainly operate in international markets. This is plausible given that
Bulgaria is a small open economy. We can also note that import penetration has a negative effect on
firm performance, but only in privatised firms. The results for Romania are also similar to the ones
that we reported in table 7. Ownership does not seem to contribute much to total factor productivity;
rather competitive pressure as measured by product market concentration is the single most important
factor that affects firm performance. However, also here the negative effect of import competition
remains statistically significant.
The results for Poland indicate that private domestic firms and foreign firms outperform state
owned enterprises. Furthermore, import penetration and more competitive market structures are
associated with higher total factor productivity. The interaction effects indicate that the effects of
product market concentration feed mainly through foreign firms, rather than domestic private ones.
The same holds for import penetration. Thus the disciplining effects of competitive pressure in Poland
are reinforced in foreign owned firms.
This re-asserts the conclusion that had been reached when analysing Bulgarian data: at some
point in the transition process, the interplay between competition and private ownership is an
important factor for the achievement of higher productivity. In Poland the leading role is played by
                                                     
5 Technically speaking, instead of using continuous shareholding variables ranging between zero and one, we now replace15
foreign-owned firms. Such outcome is not surprising: whatever the direction of causality, it is likely
that total factor productivity is highest for these enterprises. Foreign-owned firms are then expected to
benefit more from the pressure exerted by competition.
This latter point may suggest a different interpretation of the results. A possible reason why
domestic competition is associated with higher productivity in all countries (at least for private-owned
firms), while import competition is not, may depend on the initial technological and efficiency
differentials between firms operating in the same markets. If competition between similarly
productive and technologically advanced firms might eventually lead to restructuring and to improved
performance, the presence of much better firms in the same market may discourage enterprise
restructuring. Imports may come from firms with a large positive efficiency differential. Both in
Bulgaria and Romania, which lag behind in the transition process, competition from imports is
associated with lower total factor productivity. Competition may feed through a selection mechanism
where in the short run firms have increasingly less resources to implement restructuring, which may
lead to exit in the long run. In constrast, in Poland  firms went through an initial restructuring phase,
which allows them to compete in world markets.
IV. Conclusion
This paper used a unique firm level panel data set to analyse the effects of ownership and
competitive pressure on firm performance in three Central European countries. Two of them are
lagging behind in the transition process, with relatively weak institutions and slow paced market
oriented reforms, while the third one is more advanced. After controlling for firm level heterogeneity
we find that privatisation is associated with better firm performance, measured by total factor
productivity, but only in Bulgaria and Poland. Moreover, we find evidence that in Bulgaria foreign
owned firms outperform domestic privately owned firms, and that in Poland all private-owned firms
achieve higher productivity levels than state-owned ones. We do not find this result in Romania.
                                                                                                                                                                                   
them with dummies for majority ownership.16
Apart from the effects of ownership we find evidence that domestic competitive pressure is
associated with better firm performance, especially in the more advanced transition country, Poland.
Moreover, for Bulgaria we report evidence that domestic competitive pressure has only a disciplining
effect in privatised firms, not in state firms.  In Romania we find that domestic competitive pressure is
associated with higher performance irrespective of ownership. However, increased import competition
is associated with lower total factor productivity in Bulgaria and Romania, while the opposite result
holds in Poland . This suggests that foreign import competing firms are far more efficient than
domestic firms in Bulgaria and Romania, where restructuring has been postponed. If the technology
gap is too wide between domestic firms and importers from abroad, then the presence of much better
firms in the same market may discourage enterprise restructuring. Imports may come from firms with
a large positive efficiency differential.
 If this were the case, though, the order and pace of reforms should be carefully administered.
It should be insured that the intensity of competition from technologically advanced firms does not
limit the productivity growth triggered by other reforms. Instead, internal competition should be
encouraged from the early stages of transition, making sure it reinforces the beneficial effect that
sound governance has on firm performance.17
Table 1: Comparison between Amadeus and National Statistics, 1998
Bulgaria Romania Poland
Employment coverage .66 .70 .42
Sales Coverage .82 .69 .64
Note: Sales coverage ratio = total sales in Amadeus / total national sales. Employment coverage ratio
= total employment in Amadeus / total national employment.
Note: database for Poland based on F-02 questionnaire (covers all manufacturing enterprises operating
both in 1994 and 1998)
Table 2: Sales industry coverage using Amadeus data set, 1998
Industry code Bulgaria Romania Poland
15 .51 .60 .58
16 .80 .96 .35
17 1 .87 .55
18 .44 .51 .60
19 .57 .54 .53
20 .51 .41 .41
21 .76 .75 .19
22 .55 .30 .53
23 - 1 .52
24 .98 .69 .66
25 .55 .84 .37
26 .74 .79 .60
27 1 .45 .52
28 .56 .51 .53
29 .64 .76 .57
30 .23 .88 .79
31 1 .63 .61
32 1 .52 .60
33 .50 .67 .70
34 .67 .93 .56
35 .87 .68 .65
36 .43 .61 .61
37 - .75 .60
Note: Sales coverage ratio = total industry sales in the data set / total national industry sales
according to the 2-digit NACE industry classification. For Bulgaria, data on national industry sales are
not available in sectors 23 and 37.18
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the firm specific variables used in the analysis
Bulgaria Romania Poland
Mean (Stand. Dev)
1997                 1998
Mean (Stand. Dev)
1997                        1998
Mean (Stand. Dev)




160                 230
(390)             (1800)
1520                       1180
(1080)                   (4950)
26300*              28900*
(40500)             (41300)
employment (n) 374               384
(769)            (693)
728                           629
(1498)                   (1223)
170                          149
(380)                     (342)
%private domestic
ownership (privd)
fraction of privd firms in
total number of firms
0.61 0.68
(0.39)             (0.36)
0.79                  0.84
0.51  0.50
(0.39)                    (0.39)
0.87                        0.88
NA
0.69                        0.73
%Private domestic (of all
private firms)
0.77 0.81
(0.25)             (0.22)
0.58   0.57




fraction of foreign firms in
total number of firms
0.038                0.04
(0.16)             (0.18)
0.06                 0.08
0.10                        0.11
(0.27)  (0.27)
0.16                        0.17
NA
0.15                        0.16
%Foreign (of all foreign
firms)
0.68 0.63
(0.23)             (0.28)
0.67 0.68
(0.29)                    (0.30)
NA















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The data are company accounts data and were retrieved from the Romanian Chambers of Commerce
and Industry for Romania and from Creditreform Bulgaria OOD for Bulgaria. The company accounts
were made consistent, using uniform accounting methods, by Bureau Van Dijck to allow cross
country comparisons of company accounts.
For Poland, the data refer to enterprises in manufacturing, 1994 and 1998, based on F-02 and SP
statistical questionnaires. The data come from the statistical office and is confidential.
The data used in the analysis are measures as follows
Firm Specific Data
value added: sales minus material costs
employment: total number of  employed people at the end of the year
capital: book value of fixed capital
The data are deflated with a three digit producer price index
Construction of ownership data
The ownership structure for each firm in the data is provided. In particular, for each firm the name of
each individual owner is given and the fraction of shares that is owned by that owner. We defined
three groups of broad ownership categories: state, private domestic and foreign. Typically, in the state
category we include shares held by the Treasury, by communities and municipalities. We were able to
identify foreign owned firms based on the name of the owner (a foreign firm). In addition, the data
provide information whether the company is a subsidiary of a multinational enterprise. The residual
ownership category is then called the private domestic owners. The firms for which we did not obtain
ownership information were not included in the analysis. Thus we have three ownership categories:
private domestic owners: fraction of shares held by private domestic investors
foreign owners: fraction of shares held by foreign owners
state owned: fraction of shares held by the state, municipalities or Treasury.25
The sector level data were retrieved from and computed by the statistical offices:
herfindhal index: sum of the squared market shares at the three digit NACE, revision 1 level
import penetration: imports/(industy sales+imports) at the three digit NACE,revision 1 level
producer price index: a three digit producer price index, normalized to 1 in 1995.26
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Figure 3